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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether an affidavit for a search warrant, the text of 
which was prepared prior to the circumstances it describes, 
containing misstatements of fact, allegations of fact unknown to 
the affiant and at least one conclusion, and failing to allege 
more than inconclusive facts about the reliability of the 
confidential informant who was the source of the information and 
the reliability of the informant's information itself, is fatally 
defective, thereby mandating the suppression of all evidence 
obtained by execution of the warrant that issued therefrom. 
2. Whether evidence introduced at trial on the issue of 
the value of the allegedly stolen merchandise was insufficient as 
a matter of law. 
3. Whether comments prejudicial to Defendant made by the 
prosecutor during closing arguments constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct sufficient to entitle Defendant to a new trial. 
4. Whether the trial court's failure to suppress 
Defendant's 1967 misdemeanor conviction for perjury constituted 
reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 15, 1983 five (5) officers of the Ogden City 
Police Department, including Jeff M. Cottam, took part in a 
"reverse sting11 operation. They planned to sell allegedly stolen 
1 
merchandise, to-wit, a diamond ring, to Defendant through a 
police informant John Gallegos, hereinafter referred to as 
"Gallegos." (R.193, 1-22) 
Defendants business, Crazy Horse Jewelry, is located on 
2470 Washington Boulevard in Ogden, on the east side of 
Washington Boulevard diagonally north from the Ogden Municipal 
Building. Defendant's business and the Municipal Building are 
quite close to each other but are separated by 25th Street. 
As part of the operation, Cottam and Det. Greiner ". . . 
were in his undercover van parked on the southwest corner of 25th 
Street and Washington;11 Detectives Hall and Garrett were on the 
east side of the street near Defendant's place of business and 
the 5th officer, Detective Shorten, was in the Narcotics Bureau 
Office in the Municipal Building. (R.193, 25 through R.194, 11) 
Gallegos was outfitted with a transmitter as well as with a 
micro-cassette recorder, the purpose of both of which was to 
memorialize the anticipated incriminating conversation between 
Gallegos and Defendant. (R.194, 12 through R.195, 5) Detective 
Greiner was supposedly monitoring the conversation by means of 
the transmitter. 
Cottam saw Gallegos enter Defendant's business and then 
leave Defendant's business after the conversation, but could not 
see what happened inside between Gallegos' entry and exit. 
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( R . 1 9 6 , 22 t h r o u g h R . 1 9 7 , ' N e i l In* i J i I I, H mi " I 
o t h ^ r d e t e c t i v e s , H a l l a n d G a r r e t t , * < i . i l fh j t o
 9< IF 
a n y l h i iiji m i m i i i i u ) 
T h r o u g h t h e m i c r o p h o n e G a l l e g o s war w e a r t u g L'ottatii a n a lu ' i 
Grt» H U M h i M r d ihi» I i r s f p a r t it l lie c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n 
D e f e n d a n t ami O a i i e g u b , I «i" " I n' ' ' < n ' P I < »I *>H ill <^,;"» 
12 t h r o u g h R .196 , 1 J ) A 1 r a n s c r i p t of Llie a i l e g e t l c o n v e r s a t i o n 
i«i ,|ii c p a r p i l li In nitate (R SO, R x h i b l t 4-D) 
The c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n U e t e m u u i i iinn i H i i r j j i i i i tbipiii "§ 
m i n u t e s IR .1QQ, 1 4 - 1 7 ) a f t e r w h i c h G a l l e g o s c a m e o u t o f 
lie) cfj "la in i " 11 li in in i . Ii.ii I in I ii mi In MI G a l l e g o s gov? Cuff i in i in id 
t™ In €* c t h e , 1 L e c t l v e s i |t t P « a r r a n g e d h a n d s i g n a l I i t l h | L 
" w h e t h e r oi nor n s i U% had b e e n made oi n u t . 1 ( R . 2 0 0 , 24 t h r o u g h 
R. 20 i i in c in i n i HI I in1 in i I i I i in in in i in mi mi II in 11 n* I « i t h 
D e t e c t i v e H a l l d u r i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n a n d me t G a l l e g o s a b o u t i0 
-,pt n o d s a t i HI G a l l e g o s I r» f t D e f e n d a n t ' s b u s i n e s s ( R . 2 0 I , '1 23) 
a t t h e n o r t h g r o u n d l e v e l 1 : ir*; ^ i h** MHIIMH Wmii. i |Mi \\ M J i n ^ 
av**> a ^ k e d G a l l e g o s if e v e r y t h i n g had gone a s p l a n n e d , ii 
,, I m s ,„ ! I ,- bad s e t i t i f ' |K Jlt)l , 1 2 - 1 4 ) 
G a l l e g o s 'i a y , > y c . i , n t • p u i n ' i j m im i wi-j i i i , n u n i m i H I i i , 
o u t ul* 111 i p o c k e i 11 w h i c h t i m e D e t e c t i v e S h o r t e n t o o k 
[(ia 1 1 Hgn I i mi 1 1 I I f I 11 i hi i I hi f lie b i I I s and s e a r c h e d h i m , ' 1 
( R . 2 0 1 , 1 4 - l ' > ) 1 tie e n t i r e c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n t u t t - u i t JIMI 
G a l l e g o s ^ook
 | l u t M J 1 C Lhan l b s e c o n d s , ( R . 2 0 2 , 5 - 7 ) 
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Cottam immediately went to the magistrate, Judge Ziegler, in 
the Ogden Municipal Building (R.202, 9-13 and R.203, 7-11) with 
an affidavit to apply for a search warrant. The "facts" alleged 
in the affidavit were typed in prior to the transaction itself. 
(R.204, 10-15 and R.204, 25 through R.205, 9) 
The search warrant (R.5) issued and officers searched 
Defendant's business, during which they found the ring allegedly 
taken into Defendant's business by Gallegos, and upon which this 
action was based. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The affidavit executed by Detective Jeff M. Cottam in 
support of his application for a search warrant contained 
material misstatements of "facts;" alleges "facts" unknown to 
affiant at the time the search warrant was applied for; contained 
at least one conclusion; and was generally insufficient to allow 
the magistrate to find probable cause. Furthermore, the 
affidavit fails to adequately establish the credibility of the 
State's confidential informant and the information he gave. 
2. The evidence presented at trial relating to the value of 
the allegedly stolen merchandise was insufficient to establish 
such value. The State's witness did not establish his expertise 
to give an opinion on the market value of the ring; and failed to 
establish its value on the date of the purchase by Defendant. 
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3. The prosecutor mad'j inappropriate comments about 
Def e n d a n I. i i m 11 111 JJ, I I i i 111 j.« iii g u in i] 111 m I i mi i 11 I i 1111 i >« 11 line i n n i I:I e d 11 u s 
a n d r e q u i r e s t h e r e v e r s a l of D e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n , 
4 ' ll " M ,1 P i i r t w r o n g f u l l y r e u s e d t o s u p p r e s s a 1 9 6 7 
m i s d e m e a n o r , c o n v i c t i o n fit I t n t n n r l i n t I n p e i j n i y w l i h l i III* J» h i d e d 
D e f e n d a n t f r o m t e s t i f y i n g In i n s own b e h a l f a n d w h h l i r e s u l t e d in 
p r i 1 | ml i« * i in(»[Miiiii i i f I K U'fil \* > I " J I L U I U h i s c o n v i c t i o n , 
ARGUMENT 
• THE AFFIDAVIT UPON' WHICH THE MAUibfRAIE 
RELIED TO ISSUE ITS SEARCH WARRANT 
OF DECEMBER 15, 1983 IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE, 
MANDATING THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL EVIDENCE 
OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE EXECUTION 
OF SAID SEARCH WARRANT 
1. A|j III I  in r .nil 1 1 Utah statutory authority relating to the 
issuance oi a search warrant. 
Title 7?, Chapter 25, Utah Code Annotated flQ53^ hereafter 
"UCiV" provides gv ne t <i I ! v ( o i i lit; I vsa-don? m a search woirant as 
follows: 
Proper ty : -- ' ldenee may - seized pursuant 
t o a s e a r c h * - «^nr i f - re i s p r o b a b l e 
cause to bei,**» thdt i t ,
 t / was un lawful ly 
acquired Mr IS HUlawfully possessed, 
' ^ i f i e s t h e 
c o n d i t i o n s per t inen* * i • » r^i iun W J I - J .»H M «* i -.i ^. * - ,**e 
:l ssi la nee of suth a search wdirara dw ; u ~ i o * b -
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(1) a search warrant shall not issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation particularly describing the 
person or place to be searched and the 
person, property or evidence to be seized. 
Further mandates relating to the "mechanics" of obtaining a 
search warrant are found in 77-23-4, UCA, Insofar as that statute 
relates to this action it provides as follows: 
All evidence to be considered by a magistrate 
in the issuance of a search warrant shall be 
given on oath and either reduced to writing 
or recorded verbatim, . . . 
Two other statutes define when and under what conditions 
evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant shall 
be suppressed. Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
hereafter URCrP, codified as 77-35-12, UCA, provides as follows: 
(g)(1) In any motion concerning the 
admissibility of evidence or the suppression 
of evidence pursuant to this section or at 
trial, upon grounds of unlawful search and 
seizure, the suppression of evidence shall 
not be granted unless the court finds the 
violation upon which it is based to be both a 
substantial violation and not committed in 
good faith. The court shall set forth its 
reasons for such finding. 
(2) An unlawful search or seizure shall in 
all cases be deemed substantial if one or 
more of the following is established by the 
defendant or applicant by a preponderance of 
the evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, 
willful, malicious, shocking to the 
conscience of the court or was a result of 
the practice of the Law enforcement agency 
pursuant to a general order of that agency; 
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(ii) The violation was intended only to 
harass without legitimate 1 aw enforcement 
purposes, 
(3) In determining whether a peace officer 
was acting in good faith under this section, 
the court shall consider, in addition to any 
other relevant factors, some or all of the 
following: 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search 
and seizure standards; (ii) The extent to 
which exclusion will tend to deter future 
violations of search and seizure standards; 
(i i i) Whether or not the officer was 
proceeding by way of a search warrant, arrest 
warrant, or relying on previous specific 
directions of a magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(4) If the defendant or applicant establishes 
that the search or seizure was unlawful and 
substant ia1 by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the peace officer or governmental 
agency must then, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, prove the good faith actions of the 
officer. 
The foregoing, added to Rule 12 in "982. «d> implemented by 
(lie i e g i s ( H 1.1 it i: e, a 1 M I M I I(J«* 11 y 17 - Zl • * i J. u * ^ : 
P u r s u a n t t o t h e s t a n d a r d s i< >c r iDea in 
s e c t i o n 77 -35 -12 (g ) p r o p e r t y ur e v i d e n c e 
se ized pursuant to a search warrant s h a l l not 
be s u p p r e s s e d a t a m o t i o n , t r i a l , or o t h e r 
proceeding un le s s the unlawful conduct of the 
peace o f f i c e r is shown to be s u b s t a n t i a l . Any 
"ii n 1 a w f u 1 s e a r c h o r s e i z u r e s h a l l b * 
c o n s i d e r e d s u b s t a n t i a l and in bad f a i t h if 
the w a r r a n t was obta ined w i t h m a l i c i o u s 
p u r p o s e and w i t h o u t p r o b a b l e cause or was 
executed m a l i c i o u s l y and w i l l f u l l y beyond the 
authority of the warrant or wi th unnecessary 
s e v e r i t y . 
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2. The affidavit contains material misstatements of fact 
which must be .stricken and cannot be relied upon to support the 
issuance of a search warrant. 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant (R.3 and 4) 
contains the following allegations as "facts establishing the 
grounds for issuance of a search warrant:,f 
On 12-15-83, police agent John Gallegos 
entered the business of Crazy Horse Jewelry, 
2470 Washington, and sold the above-listed 
ring to Russell Slowe, Sr. At the time of 
the transaction, Slowe was told by John 
Gallegos that the ring is stolen and that he 
needed some quick cash. Slowe purchased the 
ring, believing it was stolen, and the ring 
is currently in the business at this time. 
These acts were recorded on tape and observed 
by affiant and other police officers nearby. 
On the second page of the affidavit, (R.4) Cottam stated 
under the blank reserved for corroborative evidence the 
following: 
Police officers recorded the conversation by 
use of a tape recorder and had constant view 
of the store and on-sight view of our 
informant. 
It is Defendant's contention that the trial court erred in 
failing to suppress all evidence obtained by the State in 
execution of its search warrant on December 15, 1983 on the basis 
that the affidavit executed by Detective Jeff iM. Cottam contained 
(1) key allegations of "facts" which were actually unknown to the 
affiant; (2) that at least one material statement in the 
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affid~~i^ contained * conclusion rather than, d J a , I du - . it 
by SMtare *nii i'' -fher material statements ''it- affidavit 
allege , 
D a r i n g ift*< ? i> , r e s s i o u h e a r in g ..>-i i <n A , , * , * 
C o t t a m r r * f-- ' u n d e r o a t h c e r t a i n o* t' \u^nt ; -, ^
 L
 s
 - •* 
d i s cus se - a 
the ii l ega t ions .* a f f idav i t . 
POINT c o n t a i n s s u b s t a n t i a l f a c t u a l e r r o r s . 
The af f j ! . > 1i e f. . I 11 w i• w a % I 11 I I illi i1 I111 li n 
Gal l e g o s t h a t t h e r i n g was -• ^Len and rhail lie neei led , iiiie q u i c k 
- i ' ink ri"wn t o C o t t a m i" fhe 
t i m e ^ X M ^, i t M.' : * a f f i d a v i t , .,,. I ,IL Lua 1 I y p r r o n e u u i ir 
t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : 
1 . w i ill I in I I1 I HI s e e 
G a l l e g o s a i r u e * "^fentidni > i>i.**c \" b u s i n e s s ami l e a v e , 
:• 2 4 - 2 5 * ' -** ^ ep «" Ht w a s g o i n g on i n s i d e 
Def en ^3 . . • . ! m iiiii (11, I "id ? i il li i n^h 
R . 1 9 7 , I ) 
S e c o n d l y , a i t h o m ? ^ r " f f . ^ ' =TM D e t e c t *< G r e i n e r 
s u p p o s e d l y h a d t h e r a p d f 
a c t u a l l y hear the conversa t ion *e: **>*- i defendant and u a i i e g o s , 
(R, IMS , I I II 5) C >1 :t im v i i ed iu i] < *?-* g r e e t 
Mr• S1 owe w hen he ca.iir
 Lu , • e a s i n e s s , a n . 
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had a ring, a stolen ring hefd like to show him," (R.196, 3-7) 
which, according to the State's transcript of the conversation 
never occurred. Not only was the word "stolen" never used, but 
also Gallegos never did tell Defendant that Gallegos needed 
"quick cash." (R.50, Exhibit 4-D) 
3. Neither could Cottam have acquired hearsay information 
from Gallegos or the other officers prior to executing the 
affidavit. Gallegos, after a 2h minute conversation with 
Defendant, (R.199, 17) came out of Defendant's business and gave 
Cottam and others a pre-arranged hand signal ". . . to be shown 
as to whether or not a sale had been made or not." (R.200, 24 
through R.201, 1) Cottam described what happened next as 
follows: 
I then -- I then left the van, met Mr. 
Gallegos at the north ground level doors, 
asked him if everything had gone as we had 
planned, if it had gone down exactly as we 
had set it up. He says yes, he pulled two 
twenty dollar bills out of his pocket, at 
which time detective Shorten took him into 
the office with the bills and searched him. 
(R.201, 11-16) 
The conversation between Cottam and Gallegos described in 
the next preceding paragraph took no more than 15 seconds. 
(R.202, 7) In any event, Cottam did not put in the affidavit for 
the search warrant anything that Gallegos may have told Cottam 
after the transaction and prior to the issuance of the search 
warrant (R.210, 11-14) and Cottam further admitted that no 
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i n f o r m a t i o n w a s g i v e n t o i lie m a g i s t r a t e h y h i m o t h e r tlidiii I h e 
I n I i i r H I i l 11»11 11 in I in I mi in i i II il I mi I l mi i in I \ i d a v mi I mi I s i »• I11 f R , 3 M 1 , 1 < ) •,! 1 I 1 n 
f a c t , t h e a f f i d a v i t u s e d b i b o l t a i i t w a s llyfjed p i ' l o i I i I tic 
c o n v e r s a t i o n h e r w e e n Ga l I e p o s arid Id1 f e n d a n t , p r e c l u d i n g t h e 
p O S S i l " 1 I I'1 I ' 11 '" ' i n "I Hi I i f*? I I * i' I i i i I" I I I I f1 )", • W i " mini I 
(R."!n4 , 12 Ml 
POINT II* Tii«' hffiant Jeff Cottam alleged "facts" which 
w e r e u n k n o w n i HI IIIII I iiii ill il iiiiiii t i m e t h e rit'il iiiLiii 11 was i MM HI iriiiii il IMJ 
l a s t s e n t e n c e , • t h e " f a c t s 1 1 a l l e g e s t h a t | l | l i e s e *n I . w e r e 
i >> ; in mi in I m b s e r u e d h i a f f i a n t iind u l h i ' i p o l i c e 
o f f i c e r s n e a r : - R, " m in (i |( 71 " T h i s l * i n in p I i I i' I '- i i  Ii I I i 111 
f o u n d a t i o n a s f a r a s C o t t a m w a s c o n c e r n e d a s I s s ^ t f o r t h 
h e r e a f t e r : 
1 . Not o n l y d i d C o t t a m n o t i r f n a l l y s e e i lie a l l e g e d s a l e 
( R . 2 0 * H; a n d ft /08™ 1 - 7 ) a n d d m 1111  HI n t u . i l l y h e a r t h e 
t r a n s . ^ .011 IIIIIII I 1 I! 1 ( I <• 1 lit I 1 s \,v 11 c ill il I III 1 il 11 | II 1II n ? S 
t h r o u g h R«20? , 8) w h i c h w a s a f t e r t h e w a r r a n t i s s u e d , IR.2U" 11 • 
IRI bill" a l s o d i d n o t know a n d w a s »• " r )ld by e i t h e r of f lie o ther 
d e t e c t i ves , 1," . , ! » , l " • v ' ll1 \ \\#. 
( R . 1 9 7 , 14- l h i and R . 2 0 9 , 6 - 1 0 ) 
2 . Fin l lifMi more, Cottam did not know if the o f f i c e r s *ii -lie 
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Narcotics Bureau Office actually recorded the transaction, 
(R.198, 3-6) although again Cottamfs allegations in the affidavit 
state otherwise. 
POINT III: The information alleged in the affidavit as 
"corroborative" was unknown to affiant at the time the affidavit 
was executed. The supposed "corroborative" evidence on page 2 of 
the affidavit, i.e., "Police officers recorded the conversation 
by use of a tape recorder and had constant view of the store and 
on-sight[sic] view of our informant," suffers from the same 
deficiencies as the initial "facts" in support of the search 
warrant which are discussed above. Cottam had no information 
whatsoever that the conversation had been recorded inasmuch as he 
did not listen to the recording of the conversation until after 
the execution of the search warrant by the magistrate and did not 
know what, if anything, the other officers were able to observe. 
POINT IV: The affidavit contains a material conclusion 
which cannot be considered by the magistrate in issuing a search 
warrant. The allegation that Defendant purchased the ring, 
"believing it was stolen," is likewise erroneous and a 
misstatement of fact which constitutes no more than a conclusion 
on the part of Cottam which does not comply with the requirements 
of the Utah Code set forth above and as such cannot be considered 
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In- I I IH Vmirt in A l l e n v . L i n d b e c k t 9 7 U u T J 7 1 , 9 1 P ,2d 9 2 0 
|IVH*'I I " I I H ' MI t h i s p n s l l t o u ,M 'J",!/! .1% l«ill nr c i t i n g an Idaho 
case as a u t h o r i t y : 
Under the g rea t weight of a u t h o r i t y of both 
s t a t e and f e d e r a l c o u r t s , a s e a r c h w a r r a n t 
i s s u e d u p o n i n f o r i a t i o n and b e l i e f , 
u n s u p p o r t e d by f a c t s s u b m i t t e d t o t h e 
m a g i s t r a t e , and based upon t h e conclusions of 
t h e a f f i a n t r a t h e r t h a n t h e f a c t s , i s 
i l l e g a l , and a search conducted thereunder i s 
u n 1 a w f u 1 a n d i n v i o 1 a t i o n o f i i ** 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s w i t h r e l a t i c 
sea rches and s e i z u r e s , [emphasis added] 
POINT « I liH i il 1 11 ii 111 e s u 1 t li L 11 I "I «l i I i I I 
i n s u f f i c i e n t to support the i s suance of <i Mtarch warrant. I'lie 
m a g i s f i .il - I i il i IH> - m l iii-ril I i I I IP f o u r c o r n e r s o f t h e 
a f f i d a v i t in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r not. t in - s a m e In su f (" if i (.• i , 
P e o p l e t y_ J a c k s o n , C o l o r a d o , 5 4 3 P . 2 d 7 0 S ( 1 9 7 5 ) ; P e o p l e v ^ 
B r e t h a u e r , C o l o r a d o , II11 III' ' i I " I II"" i" ' I l i Il , > t_a t_ i i _, 1 r e a d way „ 
2 8 U t a h 2d I b O , 409 P . J d H4o \\*7l) 
l l e f V o l i i i 1 . \ f t a c k s t h i s a f f i d a v i t w l i h l u l l k n o w l e d g e t h a t 
t h e a f f i d a v i t LJ a: ^ i \r < p ( i I i i i •» f i • I 
r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l In I l« i *« c o u r t . U.S. v^ V e n t r e s c a , 1811 II '1, 
102 Hi i i i II in. L.Ed.2d 684 (IQftS) Fur thermore , Defendant 
r ecogn izes that in of l itiriv n "jtippoi i ing I lie mi i i .c a < h 
w a r r a n t mav be based upon h e a r s a y p r o v i d i n g t h e r e is a 
shorn hi|,» " lolorlj'j \n it" "ii1 si ances |nst Ifying * • '">.<* \ i s i * M i of 
t h e i n f o r m a n t 1 , r e l i a b i l i t y and c r e d i b i l i t y , ' b l a i e v , 
For t , Utah, 572 P.2d 1387, 1389 (1977) See a l s o Allen v^ _ 
Lindbeck, 97 Utah 471, 93 P.2d 920 (1939) and State v^ Treadway, 
28 Utah 2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972) 
In People v^ Malone, Colo. , 485 P.2d 499 (1971) the cour t 
held a t 500 t h a t f a l s e or er roneous f a c t u a l s t a t e m e n t s in an 
af f idavi t for a search warrant must be s t r icken and could not be 
considered in the determination of whether or not the af f idavi t 
was s u f f i c i e n t to support the i s suance of a search war r an t . 
However, the court also conceded that the remaining a l lega t ions 
could be cons ide red , if found s u f f i c i e n t by themse lves , to 
support the issuance of a search warrant. 
However, with regard to a f f idav i t s containing misstatements 
and erroneous s t a t e m e n t s , i t has a l s o been found t h a t where a 
misstatement i s mater ia l to a showing of probable cause, that 
miss t a t emen t w i l l i n v a l i d a t e the e n t i r e a f f i d a v i t . Schmid v. 
S ta te , Alaska, 615 P.2d 565 (1980) In the Schmid case, the court 
s t a t e d t h a t a f ac t was "mater ia l 1 1 for purposes of a search 
warrant af f idavi t 
". . . i f omission would make a f f i d a v i t 
subs t an t i a l ly misleading and, on review under 
s t a tu t e authorizing motion to suppress, fac ts 
must be deemed mater ia l for such purpose if, 
because of t h e i r inhe ren t p r o b a t i v e f o r c e , 
there is subs tan t ia l p o s s i b i l i t y they would 
have a l te red reasonable magis t ra te ' s probable 
cause determinat ion . 1 1 West 's Ann.Const.Art 
1, Section 13; West's Ann.Pen.Code, Sections 
1538.5-1540. 
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There is further authority that in the event of a material 
misstatement, the warrant shall be voided and the fruits of the 
search occasioned thereby will be suppressed. State v. Larson, 
Wash.App., 613 P.2d 542 (1980) 
Certainly the erroneous allegations and statements in the 
affidavit under scrutiny by this Court are material to the 
sufficiency of the affidavit, and whether this Court applies the 
principles of Schmid and Larson or of Malone, the result must be 
the same. The affiantfs statements in the affidavit of what was 
said at the time of the conversation between Defendant and 
Gallegos were inaccurate; Cottam did not even really know 
Defendant had purchased the ring, because Gallegos only said 
"yes" to CottamTs question ". . . if it had gone down exactly as 
we had set it up," which was itself a distortion of what actually 
happened; CottanTs statement that the acts were recorded on tape 
and observed by other police officers was not true; and the 
corroborative information consisted of "facts" unknown to Cottam; 
and the statements regarding the alleged reliability of the 
informant and the information received from him is materially 
lacking. For the foregoing reasons this Court should nullify the 
search warrant of December 15, 1983 and suppress the fruits of 
said search warrant. 
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3. The affidavit fails to show underlying facts and 
circumstances sufficient to show probable cause and fails to 
establish the credibility of the State's confidential informant. 
Page 2 of the affidavit provides a blank space reserved for 
the affiant's statement why the affiant considers the information 
received from the confidential informant reliable. Although 
Gallegos was not identified as a confidential informant per se, 
Cottam did state the following relative to his reliability as a 
confidential informant: 
Gallegos has assisted police officers on 
prior occasions, resulting in the clearance 
of more than 25 burglaries, and several 
felony arrests and convictions. 
Information from a reliable informant may be relied upon to 
show probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant, as long 
as the information meets certain tests. In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v\ 
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), 
the United States Supreme Court mandated as minimum requirements 
(1) that the applicant set forth in the affidavit "underlying 
circumstances11 sufficient to allow the magistrate to discern the 
validity of the informant's information and (2) that the affiant 
specify why he claims the informant to be reliable and his 
information credible. The two-pronged test of Aguilar and 
Spinelli has, however, recently been abandoned by the United 
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S t a t e s Supreme Court in favor of a more comprehensive t e s t , the 
adopt ion of which the Court , in I l l i n o i s v .Gates , U.S. , 
103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) e x p l a i n e d (103 S.Ct. a t 
2332) as f o l l o w s : 
[W]e conclude t h a t i t i s wise r to abandon the 
" t w o - p r o n g e d t e s t " e s t a b l i s h e d by o u r 
d e c i s i o n s in A g u i l a r and S p i n e l l i . In i t s 
p l a c e we r e a f f i r m t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e 
c i r cums tances a n a l y s i s t h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y has 
informed probable cause d e t e r m i n a t i o n s . The 
t a s k of the i s s u i n g m a g i s t r a t e i s s imply to 
make a p r a c t i c a l , common-sense d e c i s i o n 
w h e t h e r , g i v e n a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e t 
f o r t h in the a f f i d a v i t before him, inc lud ing 
t h e " v e r a c i t y " and " b a s i s of knowledge" of 
persons supplying hearsay in fo rmat ion , t h e r e 
i s a f a i r p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t c o n t r a b a n d or 
e v i d e n c e of a c r i m e w i l l be found in a 
p a r t i c u l a r p l a c e . 
This Court has a p p a r e n t l y taken the p o s i t i o n , however, t h a t 
A g u i l a r - S p i n e l l i may s t i l l be v i a b l e . In S t a t e v. Ba i l ey , Utah, 
675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (1984) t h i s Court s t a t e d : 
However, even under t h i s [ I l l i n o i s v. Gates] 
s t a n d a r d , c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e A g u i l a r -
S p i n e l l i g u i d e l i n e s may be necessa ry to make 
a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r p r o b a b l e c a u s e . 
Depending on the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a showing of 
t h e b a s i s of k n o w l e d g e and v e r a c i t y o r 
r e l i a b i l i t y of t h e p e r s o n p r o v i d i n g t h e 
i n f o r m a t i o n f o r a w a r r a n t may w e l l be 
n e c e s s a r y t o e s t a b l i s h w i t h a " f a i r 
p r o b a b i l i t y " t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e s o u g h t 
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s and can be found where t h e 
informant s t a t e s . 
17 
The Aguilar-Spinelli requirements are discussed in People v^ 
Brethauer, Colo., 482 P.2d 369 (1971) and in Schmid v^_ State, 
Alaska, 615 P.2d 565 (1980), both of which are cited above and 
have been recognized by this Court in State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 
2d 160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); State v. Fort, Utah, 572 P.2d 1387 
(1977); State v^ Romero, Utah, 660 P.2d 715 (1983); and State v^ 
Jordan, Utah, 665 P.2d 1280 (1983) In Brethauer, the affidavit 
contained the allegation that the affiant upon oath, ". . . has 
reason to believe . . ." and went on to describe several places 
where contraband drugs and related parphernalia were supposedly 
located. The affidavit further stated: 
The facts upon which this affidavit is based 
are as follows: That an informer, known to 
the affiant to be reliable, based on past 
information supplied by the informer which 
has proved to be accurate has told the 
affiant that approximately 50 capsuls [sic] 
containing L.S.D. and at least two ounces of 
marijuana are at these premises. The 
informer has on two occassions [sic] 
purchased L.S.D. and S.T.P. within the past 
five days. These capsuls [sic] were 
delivered to the Weld County Sheriff's Office 
and were tested and did contain L.S.D. and 
S.T.P. At the time of purchase the informer 
saw other capsuls [sic] containing L.S.D. and 
S.T.P. and the party making the sale said he 
had two ounces of marijuana. The party also 
said he was going to obtain 1100 additional 
capsuls [sic] of L.S.D. and two kilograms of 
marijuana and offered to sell to the informer 
one kilogram of marijuana. The informer is 
to make the purchase today. The informer 
also saw instruments for use in smoking 
marijuana on the premises. 
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The court in Brethauer found the affidavit fatally defective 
and ordered the information found pursuant to the search warrant 
to be suppressed for six (6) different reasons, discussed at 482 
P.2d 371, two (2) of which apply to the facts of this case. At 
371 the court stated: 
1. The reliability of the informer is not 
established, and no basis is set forth to 
establish the source of this information. 
. . . 
3. The affidavit does not set forth whether 
the information obtained by the informer was 
from another person or through the informer's 
own observations. 
. . . 
With regard to the f i r s t requi rement of Aguilar and 
Sp ine l l i , the court in Brethauer reasoned the magistrate did not 
have suff ic ient information to perform his function and made the 
following observation at 373: 
Before the i s s u i n g m a g i s t r a t e can p rope r ly 
perform h i s o f f i c i a l func t ion he must be 
a p p r i s e d of t h e u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s and 
c i r cums tances which show t h a t t h e r e i s 
probable cause to bel ieve that proper grounds 
for the issuance of the warrant ex i s t . Mere 
affirmance of the bel ief or suspicion on the 
o f f i c e r ' s p a r t i s not enough. To ho ld 
o t h e r w i s e would a t t a c h c o n t r o l l i n g 
signif icance to the of f icer ' s be l ief ra ther 
t h a n t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e ' s j u d i c i a l 
determination, [ c i t a t ions omitted] 
POINT I: The affidavit does not f i l l the f i r s t requirement 
of the A g u i l a r - S p i n e l l i t e s t . The a f f i d a v i t in t h i s case i s 
inadequate for the same reason, i .e . , i t does not comply with the 
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first test of Aguilar and Spinelli. The "facts establishing 
grounds for issuance of a search warrant," as discussed above, 
are not only deficient in that they fail to demonstrate ". . . 
that the informant obtained the information in a reliable 
manner." Schmid v. State, Alaska, 615 P.2d at 574. There are no 
"facts and circumstances" in the affidavit which show the facts 
themselves to be reliable, and even the bulk of the allegations 
that are found in the affidavit is erroneous, as discussed in 
section 2 above. The affidavit simply does not comply even with 
the first requirement of Aguilar and Spinelli 
POINT II: The affidavit likewise fails to fill the second 
requirement of the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Brethauer court 
also found that the affidavit before it failed to comply with the 
second requirement of Aguilar and Spinelli. At 373 the court 
explained: 
. . . we have declared that an affidavit does 
not establish the credibility of an informant 
by merely stating that the informant is known 
to be reliable. . . . Nor does an affidavit 
establish the credibility of an informant by 
merely stating that the informant is known to 
be reliable based on past information 
supplied by the informer which has proved to 
be accurate. 
In the affidavit before this Court there is no allegation 
whatsoever regarding the validity or accuracy of Gallegos1 
previous information to the police and there is no allegation 
stating where the affiant acquired the information, such as it 
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was, about Gallegos. The statement that Gallegos has helped the 
police in the past and that this resulted in the "clearance of 
more than 25 burglaries, and several felony arrests and 
convictions" does not even come close to filling the second prong 
of the Aguilar and Spinelli test as reflected in the Brethauer 
case. In fact, the Brethauer affidavit stricken by that court 
was clearly more complete than the affidavit in this case. 
This Court should regard Gallegos1 "information" with a 
jaundiced eye and subject such information to stricter scrutiny 
than a "regular" citizen informant by virtue of the fact that 
Gallegos is a convicted felon. (R.409, 1-6) In the affidavit 
itself Gallegos is identified only as a "police agent," and it 
seems reasonable to require the applicant to make the magistrate 
aware of Gallegos1 record, since it is a fact or circumstance 
which relates directly to the informant's reliability—or lack 
thereof. This Court, in State v^ Treadway, Utah, 499 P.2d 160 
(1972) recognized a difference between the motivation of a named 
citizen informant and an unnamed police informant. Although 
Gallegos in this case was named, he may have been motivated by 
circumstances discussed in Treadway at 848 and for that reason 
this Court should apply the same principle here. 
21 
POINT III: The affidavit is also deficient under the 
Illinois v. Gates test. Neither does the affidavit comply with 
the minimum requirements of Illinois v. Gates, supra. In fact if 
the Court uses that test instead of Aguilar-Spinelli, the 
affidavit may well be even more deficient. Applying the 
"totality of circumstances" test of Gates, there continues to be 
a substantial dearth of "circumstances" from which probable cause 
may be distilled. The test of Gates does not erase the erroneous 
statements made in the "fact" allegations. (R.3) Neither does 
it render the supposed "corroborative" facts (R.4), themselves 
untrue, more true. Neither does it create validity in the 
allegations regarding the confidential informant's reliability 
(R.4) or the trusworthiness of what he supposedly said. In sum, 
the affidavit is unconstitutionally deficient no matter what test 
is applied to it, and the warrant which issued therefrom cannot 
stand. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW TO PROVE THE VALUE 
OF THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY DEFENDANT 
Defendant was charged with attempted theft, a 3d degree 
felony, in violation of 75-6-408, UCA, as follows: 
Said defendant did attempt to receive, retain 
or dispose of the property of another, to-
wit: a ring of a value in excess of 
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$1,000.00, knowing that the property had been 
stolen or believing that it probably had been 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof. 
By virtue of 76-6-412, UCA, the substantive offense is a 
second degree felony if, as alleged here, the stolen property has 
a value exceeding $1,000 and 76-4-102, UCA, provides that an 
attempt to commit a 2d degree felony is itself a 3d degree 
felony. In any event the value of the allegedly stolen 
merchandise is an absolutely critical element of the Statefs 
case. If the State has failed to prove the value of the ring 
exceeded $1,000, as Defendant alleges, Defendant can be guilty 
only of a Class A misdemeanor, assuming the State has 
successfully proved the value to exceed $250.00 (UCA 76-6-412) 
This Court has established clear standards for the review on 
appeal of the sufficiency of evidence received on the trial 
level. In State v^ Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443 (1983) this Court 
stated at 444-445 as follows: 
[W]e review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably drawn from it in the 
light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted [citations omitted] 
. . . 
The fabric of evidence against the defendant 
must cover the gap between the presumption of 
innocence and the proof of guilt. In 
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fulfillment of its duty to review the 
evidence from all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court 
will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as 
it will go. But this does not mean that the 
court can take a speculative leap across a 
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. 
The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, 
must be sufficient to prove the defendant 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, [citations 
omitted] See also State v. Watson, Utah, 684 
P.2d 39 (1984); State v. JoTmson, Utah, 663 
P.2d 48 (1983); and State v^ Royball, Utah, 
689 P.2d 1338 (1984) 
This Court has held that "value11 of property allegedly 
stolen, for purposes of 76-6-412, UCA, as reflected in State v. 
Logan, Utah, 563 P.2d 811 (1977) is as follows: 
. . . its fair . . . market value at the time 
and place where the alleged crime was 
committed. 
The jury instruction given in this case on the issue of 
value was as follows: 
When the value of property alleged to have 
been taken by theft must be determined, the 
market value at the time and in the locality 
of the theft shall be the test. That value 
is the highest price, estimated in terms of 
money, for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at the time and in that 
locality, if the owner was desirous of 
selling, but under no urgent necessity of 
doing so, and if the buyer was desirous of 
buying but under no urgent necessity of so 
doing, and if the seller had a reasonable 
time within which to find a purchaser, and 
the buyer had knowledge of the character of 
the property and of the uses to which it 
might be put. (R.76) 
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In view of the foregoing requirements, the State at trial 
was obligated to prove several elements relative to the issue of 
value, to-wit: (1) the fair market value of the ring; (2) on the 
used jewelry market; (3) on December 15, 1983; (4) in Ogden, Utah 
or the general market area of which Ogden was a part. 
The State's sole witness on the element of value was Richard 
West, owner of West Jewelers in Ogden, Utah and a Certified 
Geraologist. (R.385, 1 through R.386, 2) It is Defendant's 
contention that West failed to provide sufficient competent 
evidence on value from which a jury could reasonably have 
concluded that the fair market value of the ring was more than 
$1,000.00 in the relevant market on the date of the alleged 
offense. 
Relative to the issue of fair market value West first failed 
to provide sufficient evidence to show his competency to give an 
opinion on value. He stated he dealt in gold and diamonds, but 
". . . on a retail basis—I buy them from our suppliers and 
retail them to the consuming public." (R.388, 6-12) When asked 
about his familiarity with ". . . used jewelry markets . . ." 
(R.393, 7-8) West responded: 
In the process of business, we are called 
upon many, many times to offer trade-in 
allowances for people on their diamond rings 
to apply to other purchases of diamond rings. 
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Just the fact that you are appraising for 
insurance purposes as well as estate 
purposes, those are all used pieces of 
merchandise for that purpose. 
So, in the appraisal for trade-in 
allowance we do the same thing that I have 
done here as I mentioned to you for the 
customer's diamonds and offer that value in 
trade against another one that is used. 
That's what they could get for that. 
Now, if they go out on the market to buy 
it, . . . or to sell it, you go back to your 
original definition where they are defined as 
a willing buyer and are willing, therefore, 
to sell it at their agreement. I have a lot 
of people come in asking for an appraisal for 
that purpose because they want to sell their 
diamonds. This appraisal will give them an 
estimated replacement value from which they 
can work or bargain with someone to sell. 
[Emphasis added] 
Counsel for Defendant objected to the testimony to follow on 
value (R.394, 20-25) with the objection overruled, at which time 
the Court stated that "[Mr. West] understands the used market in 
Weber County11 (R.395, 1-3) even though West had never been asked 
and had never stated he was familiar with the used jewelry market 
in Ogden, much less Weber County, Utah! In fact, West never gave 
any testimony thereafter regarding any expertise in the used 
jewelry business in the market locality. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, West was allowed to give his opinion of the value of 
the ring at $2,878.00 (R.399, 5) 
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On cross-examination West admitted that the reason for his 
appraisals dictated the amount of his valuations, i.e., 
replacement value and value for estate appraisals and for tax 
purposes. (R.399, 19 through R.400, 16) West also offered the 
following on the question of value as determined by a willing 
buyer and seller: 
Nobody can say for sure what two people are 
going to determine what [the fair price] 
might be. (R.400, 21-23) 
West further admitted that 
. . . the appraisals I do are based on use, 
usually for insurance purposes or estate 
value or if I need to sell this, what would 
it be worth if I tried to sell it and I would 
come back to the same level, again. (R.404, 
4-7) 
West further testified that his valuation of $2,878 was the 
replacement value of the allegedly stolen item, which is higher 
than at least the "estate value." (R.401, 5-7) On redirect 
(R.404, 20) West stated the estate value of an item was about 60% 
of replacement value but gave no further information on the issue 
of value, but of course neither related to the issue of fair 
market value in any event. 
The appraisal Mr. West submitted as Exhibit 6-P at the trial 
reflected only the replacement value of the merchandise as of May 
29, 1984, the date the appraisal was performed. (R.386, 17-18) 
At no time did the prosecutor elicit from West any opinion on the 
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fair market value of the merchandise on any date, much less 
December 15, 1983. Neither is there any evidence at all that 
West was familiar with the "open market" for used jewelry. He 
was familiar with the appraisal value of items brought to his 
retail store, valued for estate tax purposes and for replacement 
values for insurance purposes. However, there is nothing to 
indicate familiarity with the market in question. Furthermore, 
in all of the foregoing West never testified of any familiarity 
with any market area. 
Based upon the foregoing, there simply cannot be any way 
whatsoever that the State complied with the requirements of 
Logan, supra. The only other testimony on the record relating to 
the issue of value is that of Defendant's witnesses Dennis Bryson 
and Jack Tittensor. Both knew the used jewelry market (R.352, 1 
and R.375, 16-24, respectively) and both thought the fair market 
value of the merchandise substantially less that the State's 
witness, Bryson that the merchandise had a value of $700-800 
(R.354, 3-4) and Tittensor a value of between a low of $650 and a 
high of $1,200 (R.380, 7) There is simply insufficient evidence 
on record to support the jury's conclusion that the property in 
question had a value of more than $1,000, and Defendant's 
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conviction for a 3d degree felony should be overturned on this 
ground alone, 
III 
CERTAIN INAPPROPRIATE COMMENTS 
MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT 
REQUIRE THAT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION BE SET ASIDE 
During closing arguments in this matter on rebuttal the 
following conversation took place between the Court and counsel: 
MR. DAVIS: . . . I submit to you, ladies and 
gentlemen, there are a lot of good deals out 
there and that's the kind of problem you have 
with theft is that there's a lot of people 
who are in that business who buy those kinds 
of great deals out there and the are called 
fences and that's exactly what Mr. Slowe is. 
He is a fence. He buys that stolen property 
knowing he can't--
MR. GUYON: Your Honor, I object. There's 
no testimony whatsoever on the record that 
Mr. Slowe is a fence. 
THE COURT: The Court will sustain the 
objection. You cannot use the word "fence." 
MR. DAVIS: Okay. He is then one who buys 
stolen property and Mr. Guyon indicated that 
there are people out there who look to get 
good deals. These are exactly the kind of 
deals that the police are out there to stop 
on the basis that these are illegal kinds of 
deals. These are kinds of deals you 
shouldn't be involved in. 
Additionally, it goes down there to say 
in the instruction No. 8, and I won't go 
through all of it, but I encourage you to 
read No. a3 and 4, No. 4, part 3 and part 4 
on instruction No. 8 because is [sic] talks 
about the presumption that is raised by 
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somebody who has a l r eady or was in the 
business or who has received s tolen property 
be fo re . There has been evidence t h a t Mr. 
Slowe is that kind of an indiv idual . 
MR. GUYON: Your Honor, I have to ob jec t to 
t h a t . The evidence was t h a t he had been 
convicted of a misdemeanor offense one t ime, 
and i t i s j u s t very i r r i t a t i n g to me to 
cont inual ly have him referred to as e i the r a 
fence or someone who deals in t h i s property. 
There has been, you know, an instance that i s 
b e f o r e t h e Cour t and t h a t ' s t h e on ly 
evidence. 
THE COURT: The Court wi l l again susta in the 
o b j e c t i o n , but I have to add, t h e r e i s the 
one instance and he does deal in t h i s kind of 
p r o p e r t y , bu t t h o s e have r e f e r e n c e to 
d i f ferent th ings . He does deal in used goods 
and p a r t of h i s s t a t e m e n t , i t seems to the 
Court, has to do with dealing in the goods, 
and I th ink he has gone beyond i t so fa r as 
using the word "fence," but obviously, there 
i s t h e one c o n v i c t i o n t h a t was shown. 
(R.480, 1 through R.481, 12) 
This Court has taken the posi t ion that two (2) elements are 
necessa ry to mer i t r e v e r s a l of a conv ic t i on on the b a s i s of 
comments dur ing c l o s i n g arguments amounting to p r o s e c u t o r i a l 
misconduct , t o - w i t : (1) the remarks c a l l e d to the j u r o r s 1 
a t t e n t i o n m a t t e r s which t h e y would not be j u s t i f i e d in 
c o n s i d e r i n g in r e a c h i n g a v e r d i c t and (2) under t h e 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the j u r o r s were probably inf luenced by the 
remarks. State v. Johnson, Utah, 663 P.2d 48, 51 (1983); State 
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v^ Creviston, Utah, 646 P.2d 750, 754 (1982); and State v.Valdez, 
Utah 513 P.2d 422 (1973); and State v^ Troy, Utah, 688 P.2d 483 
(1984) 
In Johnson a t 51 the Court , a l though i t reversed the case 
for o the r r e a s o n s , found s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s for g r a n t i n g a new 
t r i a l fo r t h e same t y p e of m i s c o n d u c t t h a t e x i s t s h e r e . 
Likewise, the Court in Troy, supra, found that statements by the 
prosecutor in closing argument were suff ic ient to warrant a new 
t r i a l . State v^ Troy, Utah, 688 P.2d at 485-486) In Johnson the 
prosecutor attempted to malign defendants, os tensibly to show 
they merited conviction because they were bad or dishonest and 
not because the evidence a t t r i a l warranted c o n v i c t i o n . With 
regard to what the prosecutor ac tua l ly said, the Johnson Court 
observed at 51 
During c l o s i n g argument, the p rosecu to r 
r e f e r r e d to Wi l l i am ' s apparent r e c e i p t of 
income from Hillhaven while receiving social 
s e c u r i t y b e n e f i t s as "double dipping. '1 The 
prosecutor continued to s t a t e : "as far as I 
am concerned white co l la r crimes l ike t h i s is 
[ s i c ] a cancer on society.11 Furthermore, the 
p r o s e c u t o r r e f e r r e d t o P a t r i c i a ' s and 
Wi l l i am ' s s ign ing of Dan ie l ' s Hi l lhaven 
paychecks and d e p o s i t i n g them in t h e i r 
p e r s o n a l bank a c c o u n t s as " f o r g i n g of 
s ignatures ." Moreover, the prosecutor made 
reference to Pa t r i c i a ' s and William's f i l i n g 
f o r b a n k r u p t c y as an i n d i c a t i o n of 
d i shones ty . The p rosecu to r s t a t e d t h a t i t 
" [d]escr ibes the type of person that we are 
dealing wi th . " 
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The comments of Mr. Davis set forth above closely pa ra l l e l 
those of the p rosecu to r in Johnson. There can be no r e a l 
argument that the jurors 1 a t t en t ion was cal led to matters they 
were not j u s t i f i e d in c o n s i d e r i n g . After a l l , the ques t ion 
before the j u ry in t h i s case was not whether Defendant was a 
fence or whether Defendant ". . .[was] that kind of individual ." 
(R.480, 23) As for the second element, i t i s d i f f i c u l t , if not 
i m p o s s i b l e , to imagine the j u ry was not inf luenced aga in s t 
Defendant by those remarks. The word "fence" has such powerful 
nega t ive conno ta t ions t h a t no reasonab le or l aw-ab id ing j u r o r 
could be expected to be free from i t s influence. The image i t 
conjures up of an individual hab i tua l ly providing the means to 
every burglar for l iqu ida t ing the l a t t e r ' s s tolen merchandise is 
a c l a s s i c example of a sugges t ion which cannot be undone or 
caused to be f o r g o t t e n . If any j u r o r had any doubt of 
Defendant's gu i l t p r ior to the f ina l arguments, the comments of 
the p rosecu to r as r e f l e c t e d above c e r t a i n l y d i s p e l l e d i t , and 
such a r e s u l t i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e . Defendant i s e n t i t l e d to be 
t r i e d on the fac ts of the case, not on innuendo and name-calling, 
and t h a t r i g h t was taken from him in t h i s case because of the 
conduct of the prosecutor of which Defendant complains. 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
OF DEFENDANT'S 1967 MISDEMEANOR PERJURY CONVICTION 
Prior to the trial held in this matter on May 31, 1984 
Defendant filed its MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN EVIDENCE 
AND RENEWED MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT AND TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE (R.60-61; and R.266, 20-25) The intent of this motion 
was of course to convince the Court to exclude a misdemeanor 
conviction of Defendant for perjury in Idaho in 1967. The 
authority for this motion is Rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
hereafter "UREvid," which states in pertinent part as follows: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him 
or established by public record during cross-
examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was 
convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit* Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the 
date of the conviction or of the release of 
the witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a 
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conviction more than ten years as calculated 
herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent 
to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the 
use of such evidence. . . . 
Defendant's interest in the suppression of the conviction 
was the fact that Defendant and the Statefs confidential 
informant John Gallegos were the only eyewitnesses to the 
transaction out of which the charges against Defendant arose. As 
Defendant's counsel explained to the Court prior to the trial, 
. . . Mr. Slowe has a misdemeanor conviction 
of perjury which dates back to 1967 and 
particularly, in these circumstances, the 
only really two witnesses we are going to 
have to the transaction in this matter, 
Judge, is Mr. Slowe and Mr. Gallegos, who is 
the State's witness and those are the only 
two people who know what happened in there 
for sure. I am in a position where if I am 
to put on any evidence at all, it has to come 
from my client and I don't think that we 
ought to be hampered with a perjury 
conviction that is 17 years old. (R.267, 1-9) 
Counsel for Defendant further explained to the Court that 
Defendant's position was that the prejudicial effects of such 
evidence far outweighs any probative value the information might 
otherwise have had. (R.267, 10-24) The prosecutor argued against 
the suppression of the evidence on the basis that 
Perjury strikes it very hard whether or not 
someone is truthful and has the voracity[sic] 
of being a witness, and I think once an 
individual has been convicted of perjury, 
that that has gone beyond just the mere 
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telling of falsehoods, but that is a criminal 
falsehood, a far greater burden placed on 
that individual or far greater burden on the 
State to show that that individual has done 
so. I think that still becomes relevant. 
(R.268, 2-11) 
However, no evidence in testimony form was ever introduced 
and the Court refused to suppress the evidence of the 1967 
conviction. (R.272, 13-22) It is Defendant's contention that the 
Court should have suppressed the evidence and that its failure to 
do so invalidates Defendant's conviction for the following 
reasons: 
1. Rule 609(b) provides that ". . . the probative value of 
the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, [emphasis added] 
In this case no specific facts and circumstances were ever 
proffered to the Court, much less introduced through testimony, 
and without such information the Court could not have made any 
ruling that the probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. 
2. The proponent of the evidence, the prosecutor, is 
further required by Rule 609(b) to give to Defendant 
. . . sufficient advance written notice of 
intent to use such evidence to provide 
[Defendant] with a fair opportunity to 
contest the use of such evidence. 
35 
No such notice was given by the State, even though the 
prosecutor anticipated Defendants motion (R.269, 24 through 
R.270, 2) and therefore had intended all along to use the 
evidence of Defendants conviction. Because of the Statefs 
noncompliance with Rule 609, UREvid. and the Court's erroneous 
ruling on the probative value of Defendant's misdemeanor 
conviction, this conviction should itself be overturned. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Relative to the validity of the affidavit filed in 
connection with the State's application for search warrant, 
Defendant has shown it to be wanting. To allow such a document 
containing misstatements, erroneous allegations and conclusions 
to stand as the basis for a search warrant is unthinkable. 
On this issue Defendant seeks the suppression of all evidence 
obtained in connection with the execution of the warrant and to 
have his conviction, which was obtained as a direct result of 
this illegally-obtained evidence, overturned. 
Defendant seeks this Court's ruling that as a matter of law 
the State failed to prove that the value of the allegedly stolen 
merchandise was more than $1,000.00, with the result that the 
judgment of conviction be overturned or the crime reduced to a 
class A misdemeanor. 
36 
Defendant claims to have been denied a fair trial because of 
comments of the prosecutor during closing arguments. The fact 
that Defendant was referred to as a "fence" prejudiced the jury 
to such an extent that Defendant should be entitled to a new 
trial. 
Lastly, Defendant seeks to have this conviction overturned 
on the basis that the Court refused to suppress Defendant's 1967 
misdemeanor conviction for perjury. Defendant was seriously and 
severely prejudiced by the Court's action, and argues that the 
conviction was and is so remote in time as to have no probative 
value presently and that if it is probative that its prejudicial 
effect far outweighed any probative value. 
DATED this f 3 day of May, 1985< 
PWER W.' GUYON 
attorney for Ap^e/llant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered four (4) true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to David 
Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114 this / ^ day of May, 1985. 
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J , i %«ia IT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The u n d e r s i g n e d l ^ j i m p r f i r s t d u l y s w o r n d e p o s e s a n d s a y s : 
T h a t a f f i a n t h a s r e a s o n t o b e l i e v e t h a t 
( ) o n t h e p e r s o n ( s ) o f 
(XX) on t h e p r e m i s e s known a s Crazy Horse Jewel ry , 2470 Washington, 
( ) i n t h e v e h i c l e ( s ) d e s c r i b e d a s 
i n t h e C i t y o f Ogden / C o u n t y o f W e b e r , S t a t e o f U t a h , t h e r e i s now 
c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d a s : 
RING L a d i e s ' diamond r i n g , one 1/2 c t . diamond, s i x 10 po in t diamonds, four 4 p o i n t 
diamonds, two 12 po in t diamonds, two 8 po in t diamonds, s e t i n t h r e e whi te gold s e t t i n g s , 
so ldered t oge the r 
a n d t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y o r e v i d e n c e 
fcx) w a s u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d o r i s u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d . 
( ) h a s b e e n u s e d o r i s p o s s e s s e d w i t h t h e p u r p o s e o f b e i n g 
u s e d t o c o m m i t o r c o n c e a l t h e c o m m i s s i o n o f a n o f f e n s e . 
( ) i s e v i d e n c e o f i l l e g a l c o n d u c t . 
The f a c t s e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e g r o u n d s f o r i s s u a n c e o f a S e a r c h W a r r a n t a r e : 
On 12-15-83, p o l i c e agent John GALLEGOS en te red the bus iness of Crazy Horse Jewel ry , 
2470 Washington, and so ld the a b o v e - l i s t e d r i n g to Russe l l SLOWE, Sr . At t h e time of 
the t r a n s a c t i o n , Slowe was t o l d by John Gallegos t h a t t he r i n g i s s t o l e n and t h a t he 
needed some quick cash . Slox^e purchased the r i n g , b e l i e v i n g i t x^as s t o l e n , and the 
r i n g i s c u r r e n t l y in the bus ines s a t t h i s t ime . These a c t s were recorded on tape and 
observed by a f f i a n t and o the r p o l i c e o f f i c e r s nearby. 
F u r t h e r g r o u n d s f o r i s s u a n c e o f a S e a r c h W a r r a n t a r e a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a n d 
a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d h e r e i n . ( S e e a t t a c h m e n t ( s ) ) 
White - Court Copy 
Mi 
Your a f f i an t considers the information received from the conf ident ia l 
informant r e l i a b l e because: Gallegos has assisted police officers on prior 
occasions, resulting in the clearance of more than 25 burglaries, and several felony 
arrests and convictions. 
The following information corroborates the facts given by the confidential 
informant: Police officers recorded the conversation by use of a tape recorder and 
had constant view of the store and on-sight view of our informant. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items 
(XX in the davtime, 
( ) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe 
it is necessary to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good 
reasons as follows: 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested warrant 
not be reauired to give notice of his authority or purpose because 
( ) the property sought may be cruickly destroyed, disposed of, 
or secreted. 
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice were 
given. This danger is believed to exist because: 
Detective, Ogden City Police Department 
TITLE 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s ySV-Aay pL-^JifSe^ j&z^, 19 P ? . 
S E A R C H W A R R A N T 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by a f f i dav i t under oath having been made th is day before me by 
Detective Jeff Cottam , I am s a t i s f i ed that there i s probable 
cause to be l ieve t h a t 
( ) on the person(s) of 
(XX) on t h e p r e m i s e s known as Crazy Horse Jewelry, 2470 Washington, 
( ) in the vehic le (s ) described as 
in the City of Qgden , County of Weber, State Q£ Utah, there i s 
now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described as: 
RING Ladies' diamond ring consisting of one ,50 c t . diamond, s ix 10 point diamonds, 
four 4 point diamonds, two 12 point diamonds, two 8 point diamonds in three white gold 
se t t ings soldered together. 
which property or evidence 
(%$ was unlawfully acquired or i s unlawfully possessed. 
( ) has been used or i s possessed with the purpose of being 
used to commit or conceal the commission of an offense. 
( ) i s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: 
(X30 i n t h e dayt ime 
( ) a t any t ime day o r n i g h t 
( ) t o e x e c u t e w i t h o u t n o t i c e of author i ty or purpose 
t o make a search of the above-named or described person(s) , premises, and 
vehic le (s) for the herein above-described property or evidence and i f you 
find the same or any part thereof, to bring i t forthwith before me at the 
Circuit Court, County of Weber, S ta te of Utah, or retain such proper t 
in your custody, subject to the order of t h i s court* 
Given under my hand and dated t h i s /jclay of LJ£Q£u( />&>c # 19j^jT. tA 
White - Court Copy 
Yellow - Officers Copy 
* JOHN F. WAHLQUIST. J u d g e 
0TATK Of UTAH. * 
Plaintiff. * Case No. 15841 
vs. * Date: April 30- 1984 
RUSSELL G- SLOWE, SR., * Dean Olsen- Reporter 
Defendant. * D- C- D-, Court Clerk 
This is the time set for Defendant's Motion to Quash 
Search Warrant and to Surpress Evidence and for Return of Seized 
Property; and Defendant's Motion in Limine to Surpress Certain 
Evidence; and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
State was represented by Christopher G DAvis, Esq-
Defendant was present and represented by attorney Peter 
W. Guyon- Esq. 
Argument by counsel-
Off Jeff M. Cottum sworn and testified. Cross. 
John L- Gallegos sworn and testified. 
Further argument by counsel-
DEFENDANT RESTS BOTH SIDES REST. 
Findings of fact by the Court The Court denied all of 
the above motions. The case is to proceed to trial as set-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF WEBER, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL GEORGE SLOWE, 
Defendant. 
V 9r 
VERDICT 
Case No. 15841 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the 
above-entitled matter, do hereby find the defendant GUILTY of the 
offense of ATTEMPTED THEFT, a third degree Eelony. 
DATED this 1 day of June, 1984. 
/ F O R E M A N 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RUSSELL G. SLOWE. JR.f 
Defendant-
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
JOHN F- WAHLQUIST. Judge 
Case No. 15841 
Date: June 20 1984 
NANCY DAVIS- Reporter 
D. C D-, Court Clerk 
JUDGE DOUGLAS L. CORNABY PRESIDING FOR JUDGE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST 
This is the time set for Sentence. 
Charge: ATTEMPTED THEFT, a Third Degree Felony 
State was represented by Christopher G. Davis, Esq-
Defendant was present and represented by attorney Peter 
Guyon. Esq-
Defense counsel files a Motion for New Trial and a 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding theVerdict- Argument by 
counsel on motions. The Court denied the motions. Defense 
counsel makes a motion for Probable Cause. Denied. 
It was the judgment of the Court and the sentence of law 
that the defendant serve a term in the Utah State Prison of NOT 
TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS The Court stayed the sentence. 
Report and Imposition of Sentence set for November 27, 
1984, at 2:00 p.m.- and in the meantime the defendant was placed 
on probation with the Adult Probation Department-
TERMS OF PROBATION: 1. The defendant is to serve SIX 
(6) MONTHS in the Weber County Jail- with 5 days good time per 
month only- and the sentence is to be reviewed on the above 
report date- 2- Defendant is not to violate any laws. 3- Any 
other terms the Adult Probation Department desires to impose-
The defendant is to report to the jail on Wednesday, 
June 27- 1984. at 9:00 a-m-
